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I. INTRODUCTION
In January 1997, the 105th Congress began its session by re-
introducing an intellectual property initiative drawn up late in the last
Congress.1 The new bill, H.R. 400, is styled "The Twenty-First
Century Patent System Improvement Act." 2 According to sponsor
Representative Howard Coble of North Carolina, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, H.R. 400 is sup-
ported by "an exceptionally large and diverse coalition of small and
* Copyright © 1997 Pierre Hubert.
t J.D., 1997, New York University School of Law; M.S., 1993, University of Texas at
Austin; B.S.E.E., 1992, Rice University.
I developed this paper as a student participant in the Innovation Policy Colloquium spon-
sored by the Engelberg Center on Innovation Law and Policy at New York University School
of Law.
I thank Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss for her helpful comments on earlier drafts of this pa-
per. Any remaining errors are my own. I also thank my parents Femand and Elyane Hubert
for their encouragement and support.
1. New Congress Begins Business by Re-introducing Old IP Bills, P.T.C. LAW DAILY
(BNA) Jan. 16, 1997, at D4.
2. H.R. 400, 105th Cong. § 1961 (1997).
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large companies, independent inventors and associations representing
every type of U.S. industry and inventor that utilizes the patent sys-
tem."' 3 Title III of this important legislation deals with a complex
and controversial concept which lies at the intersection of patent and
trade secret law: the prior user defense to patent infringement, or the
so-called "prior user right."'4
The prior user right addresses the situation in which two parties
independently invent an invention. In particular, the first party to in-
vent may decide to protect the invention as a trade secret while the
second party to invent may seek and obtain a patent for the invention.
In this situation, one possible type of prior user right would operate
as a limited, non-patent-defeating defense to patent infringement, al-
lowing the first user of the invention to continue using the invention
against a patent which subsequently issues to the second inventor.5
Perhaps the best way to understand the operation of a prior user
right is to consider a hypothetical situation in which such a right
might apply. Consider the following set of facts.6
FACTS
1. A first inventor discovers a previously unknown process for
making widgets. The inventor decides to keep the process a secret.
The inventor immediately begins using the process to produce
widgets on a commercial scale. The widgets themselves do not re-
veal to the public the process with which they were made.
2. Six months after the invention was made, a second inventor in-
dependently discovers the process for making widgets. The sec-
ond inventor files a patent application and the patent issues.
3. The first inventor does not apply for a patent.
4. The second inventor sues the first inventor for patent infringe-
ment.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. E.g., Karl F. Jorda, The Rights of the First Inventor-Trade Secret User As Against
Those of the SecondInventor-Patentee (Part 11), 61 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 593 (1979).
6. This hypothetical set of facts is based on one first proposed in Frank E. Robbins, The
Rights of the First Inventor-Trade Secret User As Against Those of the Second Inventor-
Patentee (Part), 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 574 (1979).
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Resolution of the dispute depends on the applicable legal rule.
Several scholars have noted that to deal with disputes based on facts
similar to those above, a legal regime could implement one of at least
three possible legal rules:7
ALTERNATIVE LEGAL RULES
1. The "Infringement Rule": The second inventor's patent is
deemed valid and used to enjoin the first inventor's use.
2. The "Invalidation Rule": The first inventor's use invalidates the
second inventor's patent, and competition in the market for the in-
vention is unfettered.
3. The "Prior User Right Rule": The second inventor's patent is
deemed valid, but the first inventor is exempt from liability for
patent infringement.
According to both the Invalidation and Prior User Right Rules,
the first inventor's use trumps the second inventor's patent. How-
ever, according to the Prior User Right Rule, the second inventor's
patent remains valid against other parties, whereas under the Invali-
dation Rule, the patent is invalidated. While one could properly refer
to both the second and third rules as forms of a Prior User Right
Rule,8 this article uses that term to refer to a limited, non-patent-
defeating defense to infiingement.
Each alternative legal rule represents a balancing of competing
interests. These competing interests include (1) the interest of the
prior user in continuing to practice her invention, (2) the interest of
the subsequent patentee in recouping the costs of her research and
development ("R&D") and earning a profit, and (3) the interests of
the public in disseminating the invention at low cost and in encour-
aging - or at least, not discouraging - innovation.9
For more than three decades, scholars and policy makers have
debated the question of whether the Prior User Right Rule represents
7. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 6, at 574-75; F. Andrew Ubel, Who's On First? - The
Trade Secret Prior User or a Subsequent Patentee, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 401,
407 (1994).
8. The second rule, like the third, is an example of a prior user right in the broader sense
that the prior user is not enjoined from practicing her secret process to make widgets.
9. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
1998]
192 COMPUTER & HTGHTECJNOLOGYLAWJOURATAL [Vol. 14
the optimal balancing of these interests. 10 The United States is cur-
rently the only leading industrialized nation in the world that does not
include a formal prior user right in its patent statute." Recently, the
Uruguay Round of GATT12 trade negotiations, the interest in interna-
tional patent law harmonization and the talk of moving to a first-to-
file system have fueled the prior user right debate. 3
10. See, e.g., Prior Commercial Use and Patent Infringement: Hearings on HR. 2235
Before the Comm. on Judiciary and Comm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, 104th Cong.
(1995) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2235]; Robbins, supra note 6 (arguing against a prior
user right); Jorda, supra note 5 (arguing in favor of a prior user right); HAROLD C. WEGNER,
PATENT HARMONIZATION 123-24 (1993) ("[N]o particular issue has gained more notoriety,
misunderstanding and heated debate within the interested circles in the United States than [the
prior user right]."); Franklin Pierce Law Center's Fifth Biennial Patent System Major Prob-
lems Conference: Prior User Rights, 36 IDEA - J.L. & TECH. 345, 406 (1996) [hereinafter
FPLC Conference] (statement of Chris Konkol) (noting that the prior user right is "a very
controversial subject right now").
11. HAROLD C. WEGNER, PATENT HARMONIZATION 116 (1993) ("Whereas some form of
prior user right exists in the major countries of Europe and Japan (and elsewhere), the United
States is unique among the leading nations of the world in not having a prior user
right")(emphasis in original); see also Lisa M. Brownlee, Trade Secret Use of Patentable In-
ventions, Prior User Rights and Patent Law Harmonization: An Analysis and Proposal, 72 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 523, 535 (1990) (Japan, England, Germany, and France in-
clude a prior user right in their patent laws).
In the United States, perhaps the doctrine most closely resembling prior user rights is the
doctrine of "intervening rights" provided for by 35 U.S.C. § 252 (1994) (implementing inter-
vening rights in the context of reissue) and 35 U.S.C. § 307 (1994) (implementing the standard
of section 252 in the context of reexamination). Reissue is a procedure used to correct errors
made without deceptive intent that cause the patent to be wholly or partly inoperative. 35
U.S.C. § 251 (1994). Reexamination allows any person to request reconsideration of the va-
lidity of a patent's claims in light of cited prior art, and subsequently allows claim amendment
by the patentee, so long as claims are not broadened. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-305 (1994).
Intervening rights allow for continued use of a product or process after reissue or reex-
amination if a person, prior to reissue or reexamination, used or made substantial preparations
to use a product or process. 35 U.S.C. §§ 252, 307 (1994).
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1948), was not originally designed to deal
with intellectual property. Intellectual property entered into the negotiations during the Uru-
guay Round of GATT, and this round culminated in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). See Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco, April 15, 1994, Annex IC,
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
13. See, e.g., WEGNER, supra note 11 at 124-25.
Currently, the United States and the Philippines are the only countries in the world with a
first-to-invent, rather than a first-to-file, priority rule. See the discussion in ROCHELLE COOPER
DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 731-33 (1996). Talk of
implementing a first-to-file system in the United States has sparked interest in a prior user
right; most countries with a first-to-file rule include some form of the prior user right in their
patent laws. WIPO Memorandum of the Intemational Bureau, Doe. HLJCE/IV/INF/2, Sept. 7,
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Part II of this article explores the controversy by discussing the
alternative legal rules set forth above and interests which each rule
promotes. This part examines case law to find illustrations of each
rule in operation. In Part I, this article examines the provisions of
the prior user right proposed in H.R. 400, and analyzes its attempt to
balance the competing interests. This article concludes that the prior
user right of H.R. 400 represents a careful balancing of interests, and
recommends the introduction of its prior user right into U.S. patent
law.
II. ALTERNATIVE LEGAL RULES AND COMPETING INTERESTS
This section explores the controversy by discussing the alterna-
tive legal rules and competing interests set forth in Part I. This sec-
tion turns to case law to illustrate how courts have treated these com-
peting interests.
Section 102(g) of title 35 of the United States Code14 is the only
section of the Patent Act that addresses the potential conflict between
the rights of a trade secret prior user and a subsequent patentee. 5
That section, in relevant part, provides "A person shall be entitled to
a patent unless.., before the applicant's invention thereof the inven-
tion was made in this country by another who had not abandoned,
suppressed, or concealed it .... ,,16 As illustrated in the case law dis-
cussed below, 7 courts have had difficulty in interpreting § 102(g),
and they have favored different competing interests in their different
interpretations of § 102(g).
Thus, the validity of the patent depends on whether the prior
user or trade secret holder has "abandoned, suppressed, or con-
cealed"' 8 the invention. If she has, the patent is not invalid un-
der § 102(g), and the prior user who continues the use may be subject
to a patent infringement lawsuit; if she has not, the patent may be-
come invalid in view of her prior use.19
1987 at 18. The notion is that strict determination of patent rights by filing date is a harsh rule
for first inventors, who may not be the first to file for a patent.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994).
15. For purposes of this discussion, a basic assumption is that the prior use is not
"public" enough to qualify as prior art under Section 102(a) of title 35 of the United States
Code. See generally DREYFUSS AND KWALL, supra note 13, at 639-47.
16. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 30-50.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994).
19. Id; see DREYFUss & KwALL, supra note 13, at 646-47.
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Thus, the primary issue is whether a prior user or trade secret
holder has "abandoned, suppressed, or concealed" 20 her invention.
In many cases, courts have drawn a distinction between "secret
uses" and "non-informing public uses," with the former constituting
suppression or concealment on the part of the prior inventor
(therefore not invalidating the patent), and the latter invalidating the
patent.21 These cases dealing with secret uses and non-informing
public uses illustrate the outcomes under the Infringement and the
Invalidation Rules, respectively.
A. The Infringement Rule
The first alternative rule provides that the second inventor's pat-
ent is deemed valid and may be used to enjoin the first inventor's use.
The patentee is the primary beneficiary of the Infringement Rule; this
rule seeks to ensure that the patentee may recoup her R&D costs and
earn a profit.22 The public interest is satisfied insofar as this rule
promotes dissemination of knowledge by providing an enforcement
mechanism for inventors who choose to disclose their inventions
through the patent system.
Proponents of the prior user right maintain that the Infringement
Rule goes too far in promoting the interests of the patentee over the
interests of the prior user.23 They argue that a carefully drafted prior
user right statute would protect the prior user's interest in continued
use without significantly eroding the subsequent patentee's market.24
Moreover, some proponents of the prior user right contend that, by
punishing the earlier inventor, the Infringement Rule discourages in-
novation, thereby not serving the public interest.25
The Infringement Rule outcome is illustrated in case law dealing
with "secret uses."' 26 A secret use typically involves secret commer-
20. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (g) (1994).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 33-45.
22. See infra Part III.A.2.
23. See, e.g., Hearings on HR. 2235, supra note 10 (statements of Dieter Hoinkes and
Karl Jorda).
24. Id
25. See, e.g., Kyla Harriel, Note, Prior User Rights in a First-to-Invent Patent System:
Why Not?, 36 IDEA - J.L. & TECH. 543, 554-55, 564 (1996).
26. E.g., Gillman v. Stem, 114 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1940); Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon
Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock,
Inc., 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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cial exploitation of an inventive process in a factory.27 The public
may receive the benefit of a product, although the product itself does
not incorporate the invention. For example, the public may receive
the benefit of the invention indirectly in the form of lower prices.28
The theory is that since the use is "secret," the public has no
way of reverse engineering the product to discover the secret,29 and
the subsequent patentee should be rewarded for allowing the public
to access her invention where the-prior user did not allow this access.
Thus the secret use cases favor the interest of the patentee and the
interest of the public in dissemination of knowledge. 0
Recall the earlier hypothetical. 1 A first inventor discovers a
process, keeps the process secret, and immediately begins to use the
process in production. The product gives no indication to the public
as to how it was made. The first inventor never seeks a patent. Six
months later, a second inventor discovers the process. The second
inventor files an application, obtains a patent, and sues the first in-
ventor for patent infiingement.
The secret use line of cases suggests that in the above situation,
the patent is not invalid under § 102(g), and there is nothing
in § 102(g) to prevent the patentee from turning the. prior user into a
patent infringer. Gillman v. Stern32 is an example of such a case.
Gillman constructed and obtained a patent for an pneumatic
"puffing" machine for quilting. Stem subsequently invented a
similar machine. Gillman sued Stem for patent infringement. Stem
alleged that the machine had been invented and used by a third party,
a man named Haas, prior to the plaintiff's invention. Haas had used
the machine in his shop under tight security. The output from the
machine had been sold,.but the public had not been given access to
the machine itself. Judge Learned Hand found for the patentee,
holding that the prior use was secret use which was insufficient to in-
validate the plaintiff's patent. In other words, sales of a machine's
output do not anticipate that machine under § 102(g).
27. Ubel, supra note 7, at 405.
28. Harriel, supra note 25, at 561.
29. Ubel, supra note 7, at 424.
30. E.g., Gillman v. Stem, 114 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1940); Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon
Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock,
Inc., 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
31. See supra text accompanying note 6.
32. Gillman v. Stern, 114 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1940).
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Gillman illustrates the Infringement Rule outcome. The primary
interests served are the patentee's interest in recovering R&D costs
and earning a profit, and the public interest in dissemination of
knowledge. These interests differ from the dominant interests in the
cases illustrating the second alternative rule.
B. The Invalidation Rule
The second alternative legal rule provides that the first inven-
tor's use invalidates the second inventor's patent, and that the public
may freely enjoy the invention thereafter. 33 The trade secret holder is
the primary beneficiary of this rule. At first glance, the trade secret
holder who invalidates a patent under this rule nevertheless already
has lost her secret to the public domain through the disclosure re-
quirements of patent law. However, the Invalidation Rule may en-
courage second inventors to turn to trade secrecy protection in lieu of
patent protection, and this benefits the trade secret holder because the
second inventor would then "keep the secret" rather than disclose it
to the world.34
From the standpoint of proponents of the prior user right, this
rule unnecessarily ignores the interests of the patentee and the public.
The patentee loses her patent and is unable to recover R&D costs. As
for the public interest, although this rule appears to make valuable
information freely available by invalidating patents, it may not serve
the public in the long run, because it may encourage the potential
patentee to choose secrecy over disclosure, or discourage the inven-
tor's investment in innovative activities altogether.
The Invalidation Rule outcome is illustrated by case law dealing
with non-informing public uses.35 The non-informing public use, as
opposed to the secret use, typically involves commercial exploitation
of a product which incorporates the invention, but in such a way that
the product does not disclose the invention.36 Thus, the public re-
ceives the direct benefit of a better product.
In the case of non-informing public use, the theory is that com-
petitors may reverse engineer the product to discover the invention.37
33. Ubel, supra note 7, at 407.
34. Moreover, independent discovery of a trade secret by another is a foreseeable risk of
choosing trade secrecy protection.
35. E.g., Dunlop Holdings Ltd. v. Ram Golf Corp., 524 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1975).
36. Id at 35.
37. Ubel, supra note 7, at 424.
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Moreover, even if reverse engineering is very difficult or impossible,
the non-informing public use is said to be a more visible spur to
competition than secret use.38 The policy is that since the prior user
gave the public some access to the invention, the law should not turn
the prior user into an infiinger. Thus the non-informing public use
cases favor the interest of the prior user while acknowledging the in-
terest of the public in dissemination of knowledge.
Consider a variation on the earlier hypothetical. 9 A first in-
ventor discovers a chemical compound, keeps the compound secret,
and immediately begins to use the compound in products. The prod-
uct gives no indication to the public as to the composition of the
compound. The first inventor never seeks a patent. Six months later,
a second inventor discovers the compound. The second inventor files
an application, obtains a patent, and sues the first inventor for patent
infringement.
The non-informing public use case law suggests that in the
above situation, the prior user may invalidate the patent un-
der § 102(g). An often-cited case is Dunlop Holdings Ltd. v. Ram
Golf Corp.40 In Dunlop Holdings, Dunlop invented and obtained a
patent on golf balls having covers made of the synthetic material
Surlyn. Dunlop subsequently sued Ram Golf for patent infringement.
Ram Golf alleged prior use by a third party, a man named Butch
Wagner. One year before Dunlop's date of invention, Wagner, who
was in the business of selling recovered golf balls, made some sam-
ple Surlyn-covered balls by hand. Three months before Dunlop's in-
vention, Wagner developed a formula which he considered suitable
for commercial production. Wagner then provided friends and po-
tential customers with Surlyn covered golf balls. By the date of
Dunlop's invention, Wagner had received orders for more than
12,000 Surlyn-covered balls. 41
The Dunlop Holdings court held that § 102(g) precluded patent-
ability.42 The court cited three reasons for its conclusion:
First, even such a use gives the public the benefit of the inven-
tion .... If the new idea is permitted to have its impact in the
38. it4
39. This variation is based on a hypothetical fact pattern in Ubel, supra note 7, at 406.
For the earlier hypothetical, see supra text accompanying note 6.
40. Dunlop Holdings Ltd. v. Ram Golf Corp, 524 F.d 33 (7th Cir. 1995).
41. Id.at35.
42. Id. at 36.
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market place.., it surely has not been suppressed in an economic
sense. Second, even though there may be no explicit disclosure of
the invention concept, when the article itself is freely accessible to
the public at large, it is fair to presume that its secret will be un-
covered by potential competitors long before when a patent would
have expired if the inventor had made a timely application and
disclosure to the Patent Office. Third, the inventor is under no
duty to apply for a patent, he is free to contribute his idea to the
public, either voluntarily by an express disclosure, or involuntarily
by a noninforming [sic] public use.43
Wagner provided th6 public with a product incorporating the in-
vention, Surlyn-covered golf balls, but he did not explicitly disclose
the composition of the improved cover. According to the court, since
the invention itself was accessible to the public, albeit in a non-
informing state, the prior use invalidated the subsequent patent.44
Recently, some courts have decided cases in a manner contrary
to the secret use versus non-informing public use distinction, focus-
ing instead on the degree to which the public received the benefits
from the invention. In Friction Division Products, Inc. v. E.1
DuPont De Nemours & Company,45 DuPont defended a patent in-
fringement suit and moved for summary judgment on the basis of its
own prior use and the prior use of two co-defendants. One of Fric-
tion Division's arguments was that the inventive process in question
was a proprietary trade secret process, i.e., a secret use, and that the
public did not have direct access to anything incorporating the inven-
tion. The court first noted:
In order to avoid a finding that a prior invention was abandoned,
suppressed, or concealed, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g), the prior in-
ventor must take affirmative steps to make the invention publicly
known. Making the invention publicly known requires only that
the public enjoy the benefits or the use of the prior invention.46
43. Id. at 37.
44. Id.
45. Friction Div. Prods., Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 658 F. Supp. 998 (D.
Del. 1987), further proceedings, 693 F.Supp. 114 (D. Del. 1988), aft'd, 883 F.2d 1027 (Fed.
Cir. 1989). (The further proceedings deal with cross-motions for summary judgment on other
grounds).
46. Friction Div. Prods. v. E.I. DuPont, 658 F.Supp. at 1013-14 (citations omitted).
THE PRIOR USER RIGHT OF HR. 400
Then, in response to Friction Division's argument that the public
did not have direct access to anything incorporating the invention, the
court cited Dunlop Holdings and held:
[T]his argument is completely invalid as a matter of law since the
process itself does not have to be disclosed to the public in order to
avoid a finding of abandonment, suppression, or concealment of
the invention. Only the benefits of the inventor's work need reach
the public.47
The court chose to ignore the secret use versus non-informing
public use distinction. Instead, the court focused on whether the
benefits of the prior inventor's work reached the public.4
Friction Division seems to be directly at odds with W.L. Gore &
Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc.49 The Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit decided Gore four years before the District Court of
Delaware decided Friction Division. In Gore, the defendant asserted
third-party prior use as a defense to patent infringement. The third
party, Budd, had practiced a secret process (used to produce a tape of
stretched Teflon) prior to the subsequent patentee's invention date.
The invention was a trade secret or proprietary process, and therefore
was not incorporated into a product which reached the public. In-
deed, the court remarked, "[i]f Budd offered and sold anything, it
was only tape, not whatever process was used in producing it. Nei-
ther party contends, and there was no evidence, that the public could
learn the claimed process by examining the tape."50 The prior use
therefore fell into the category of "secret use," and the court upheld
the patent.
How does one reconcile Gore and Friction Division? One ex-
planation is that courts are slowly moving away from the secret use
47. Id. at 1014 (citations omitted).
48. Presumably, in a case like this one involving a trade secret process (i.e., a secret use)
used to produce goods sold to the public, the benefits of the process may reach the public in
the form of lower prices. Harriel, supra note 25, at 561.
49. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc, 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983). On its
face, this case deals with 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) and 102(b) (1994), but an analysis under
§ 102(g) is equally applicable.
As between a prior inventor who benefits from a process by selling its product
but suppresses, conceals, or otherwise keeps the process from the public, and a
later inventor who promptly files a patent application from which the public will
gain a disclosure of the process, the law favors the latter.
Gore, 721 F.2d at 1550.
50. IM at 1550. L
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versus non-informing public use distinction and are more interested
in whether or not the benefits of the invention reach the public. Like
the old inquiry, the new test would turn on a public interest, i.e.,
whether the prior user disseminated either the invention or the bene-
fits of the invention to the public.
On the other hand, some scholars point out that Gore involved
an ordinary alleged infringer asserting third-party prior use, while
Friction Division involved an actual prior user as a defendant.51 In-
terestingly, courts may be drawing the distinction not on the satisfac-
tion or dissatisfaction of a public interest, but on the strength of the
prior user's interest based on the prior user's status as a defendant or
a third party. The notion is that perhaps a prior user's interest is
strong enough to warrant invalidation of a second inventor's patent,
whereas a third-party infringer's interest is not. Professor Karl Jorda,
a staunch advocate of prior user rights, has reiterated for nearly
twenty years (most recently in late 1995) that there is no case on the
books in which a subsequent patentee has been able to enjoin or oth-
erwise stop a first inventor or prior user from practicing the inven-
tion.52 Indeed, the focus may be moving from the presence or ab-
sence of a public interest to the strength of the prior user's interest.
Section 102(g) is the source of much uncertainty for both the
trade secret holder and the patentee, and this uncertainty leads to
market inefficiency. Cases involving § 102(g) and prior use are
hardly predictable. The prior user or trade secret holder must hedge
her bets as to whether she may continue her use in the face of a sub-
sequent patent. For the patentee, § 102(g) indirectly creates a cate-
gory of prior art that some scholars refer to as "secret prior art." 51
Secret prior art is art which, although undetectable by an inventor
who diligently searches the public domain before sinking costs and
obtaining a patent, may invalidate the inventor's patent.5 4 Under the
current regime, an inventor may search the public domain, discover
51. E.g., Ubel, supra note 7; Hearings on . 2235, supra note 10 (testimony of Karl
Jorda).
52. See Jorda, supra note 5 (arguing in favor of a prior user right); FPLC Conference,
supra note 5 (statement of Karl Jorda); Hearings on HR. 2235, supra note 10 (testimony of
Karl Jorda). Few cases directly address the prior user/patentee conflict. See Brownlee, supra
note 11, at 533 n.51 (1990).
53. Under the current regime, both section 102(g) and section 102(e) of the Patent Act
create categories of "secret prior art." See, e.g., ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS AND ROBERTA
ROSENTHAL KWALL, INTELLECTuAL PROPERTY 645-46 (1996).
54. Id at 647.
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no prior art, sink costs into R&D efforts, and then obtain a patent for
his invention, only to find that a trade secret holder who has not
"abandoned, suppressed, or concealed" 55 her invention may invali-
date his patent and prevent him from recovering his costs and earning
a profit.
Both the uncertainty associated with the application of § 102(g)
and the possible shift from a focus on the public interest to the inter-
est of the prior user invite consideration of the Prior User Right Rule.
C. The Prior User Right Rule
The third alternative legal rule, the Prior User Right Rule, would
validate the second inventor's patent, while exempting the prior user
from patent infringement.56 Under a prior user right, the prior user
would be rewarded for her commercialization, and the subsequent
patentee would be rewarded for his disclosure. Moreover, the prior
user right would serve the public interest by enabling public dissemi-
nation of inventions at a low cost, arguably without discouraging in-
novation.57
Opponents of the prior user right contend that this competition
excessively erodes the patentee's market. 8 In addition, they argue
that the prior user right does not serve the public interest in dissemi-
nation because it exalts trade secrecy over public disclosure.5 9
The idea of protecting the interest of the prior user is not new to
U.S. patent law. For over one hundred years, and as late as 1952, the
patent law explicitly provided a form of prior user right.6 Even to-
day, in the context of reissue, 61 the notion of equitable "intervening
rights" allows the first user continued use of an invention after reis-
55. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994).
56. libel, supra note 7, at 407.
57. See infra text accompanying note 104.
58. See, e.g., Robert L. Rohrback, Prior User Rights: Roses or Thorns?, 2 U. BALT.
INTELL. PRoP. L.J. 1, 4-9 (1993).
59. Ad. at 12-13.
60. From 1839 to 1952, the patent law explicitly provided for a form of prior user right
by exempting from liability certain persons using or selling the invention. See Act of March 3,
1839, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 353 (1839); Patent Act, ch. 230, § 37, 16 Stat. 198 (1870) (later sec-
tion 4899 of the Revised Statutes).
61. A patentee may apply for a reissue patent to correct errors made without deceptive
intent that cause the patent to be wholly or partly invalid. 35 U.S.C.§ 251 (1994). See supra
note 11.
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sue if, prior to the reissue, that first user made, used, or prepared to
make or use the invention.62
The prior user right traces its roots to section 6 of the Patent Act
of 1836.63 According to section 6 of the Patent Act of 1836, an in-
ventor could obtain a patent on a new art, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter that was "not, at the time of his application for
a patent, in public use or on sale, with his consent or allowance.""
Section 7, which supplemented section 6, provided
That every person or corporation who has, or shall have purchased
or constructed any newly invented machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter, prior to the application by the inventor or dis-
coverer for a patent, shall be held to possess the right to use, and
vend to others to be used, the specific machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter so made or purchased, without liability
therefor to the inventor, or any other person interested in such in-
vention .... 65 No patent shall be held to be invalid, by reason of
such purchase, sale, or use prior to the application for a patent as
aforesaid, except on proof
(1) of abandonment of such invention to the public; or
(2) that such purchase, sale, or prior use has been for more than
two years prior to such application
for a patent."
The Supreme Court first addressed section 7 in McClurg v.
Kingslands7 In that case, an inventor developed and patented an in-
vention while employed by the defendants. When the inventor left
his job and assigned his rights to one of his former employer's com-
petitors, that assignee sued the former employer under the patent.
The Court noted that section 7 had two objectives: (1) "to protect the
person who has used the thing patented, by having purchased, con-
structed, or made the machine,... from any liability to the patentee
or his assignee," and (2) "to protect the rights, granted to the pat-
entee, against any infringement by any other person."' 68 The defen-
62. E.g., Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packing, Inc., 756 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
63. Act of July4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
64. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). See generally 2 DONALD S.
CHIsUM, CrusuM ON PATENTs § 6.02[1l[b] (1997).
65. Act of March 3, 1839, ch. 357, § 7[A], 5 Stat. 353 (1839).
66. Act of March 3, 1839, ch. 357, § 7[B], 5 Stat. 353 (1839).
67. 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843).
68. Id at 208-209.
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dant was allowed to continue making and using the invention, and
since the inventor had filed during the two-year grace period, the as-
signee had patent rights against the rest of the world (minus the de-
fendant).69
The prior user right eventually disappeared from the books, and
explicit provisions for prior user rights were repealed during the codi-
fication of the patent laws in 1952.70 A committee report noted that
the relevant sections had become "redundant and unnecessary. '71
Given the rich history of the prior user right in U.S. patent law, how-
ever, it is not surprising that it was the subject of proposed legislation
in 1967,72 and is again the subject of proposed legislation.7 3 The fact
that the prior user right has proven itself workable in the past sug-
gests that there is no reason to fear that its current introduction would
disrupt the successful operation of the Patent Act. The following
section explores the prior user right proposed in H.R. 400.
III. H.R. 40074
Following the passage of GATT and responding to an increased
interest in patent harmonization, Congress addressed the issue of
prior user rights a few years ago with both a Senate bill and a House
bill. On October 8, 1994, the Senate passed the Patent Prior User
Rights Act of 1994.75 This bill provided that if, before the effective
filing date of the application, a person commercially used in the
United States any subject matter claimed in the patent, or made ef-
fective and serious preparation in the United States, then that person
would not be liable for infringement of the patent.76 The bill also ex-
69. Id. at 209.
70. H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., Table 3, at 72 (1952).
71. Id.
72. S. 1042, 90th Cong. § 274 (1967) (third party rights amendment to S. 1042 on May
3, 1967). The Patent Reform Bill of 1967 did not become law.
73. H.R. 400, 105th Cong. § 1961 (1997).
74. H.R. 400 (see APPENDix A):
This title and the amendments made by this title shall take effect on the date of
the enactment of this Act, but shall not apply to any action for infringement that
is pending on such date of enactment or with respect to any subject matter for
which an adjudication of infringement, including a consent judgment, has been
made before such date of enactment.
H.R. 400.
75. S.2272, 103d Cong. (1994).
76. Id.
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empted "good faith purchasers" who bought products from the prior
user, and then used or sold them.77 Unfortunately, due in part to its
late introduction, the bill died with the 103rd Congress. 78
The following year, on August 4, 1995, Representative Carlos
Moorhead sponsored the Prior Domestic Commercial Use Act of
1995. 79 This bill, H.R. 2235, required the person asserting the prior
user right to have commercially used or reduced to practice the sub-
ject matter on which the right was based more than one year prior to
the effective filing date of the application for the patent.8" H.R. 2235
became Title III of H.R. 3460, and H.R. 3460 was approved by the
House Judiciary Committee in July 1996.81 On January 9, 1997, H.R.
3460 was re-introduced in the 105th Congress as H.R. 400.82 On
April 23, 1997, an amended 3 H.R. 400 passed the House, and the bill
was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. During the
editing of this article for publication, the Senate is considering S.507,
the "Omnibus Patent Act of 1997," which largely adopts the prior
user right proposed in H.R. 400.85 This subsection examines the rele-
vant portions of H.R. 400.
H.R. 400 provides for a limited prior user defense.86 To summa-
rize the proposal, H.R. 400 (1) allows good-faith prior users to prac-
tice the tedhnology (and any variations and improvements that do not
77. Id.
78. See 50 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 365 (Aug. 10, 1995).
79. H.R. 2235, 104th Cong. (1995).
80. Id.
81. H.R. Rep. No. 879, at 383-385 104th Cong. (1997).
82. New Congress Begins Business by Re-introducing Old IP Bills, supra note 1. Pat.
Trademark &Copyright L. Daily (BNA), Jan. 16,1997, at D4.
83. The Kaptur Amendment (HA. 29) was agreed to on April 23, 1997. This amend-
ment classifies research conducted for the public good by a laboratory or nonprofit entity as
"commercial use" within the meaning of the proposed statute.
84. Thomas: Legislative Information on the Internet (visited June 14, 1997)
<http:llthomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/zdlOS:HR00400:@@@X>.
85. For the latest information on S. 507, visit Thomas: Legislative Information on the
Internet (visited July 7, 1997) <http://thomas.loc.gov> or Intellectual Property Owners'
Website (visited July 7, 1997) <http://ipo.org/Senatel05th>. Some proponents of the prior user
right of H.R. 400 and S. 507 anticipate that the legislation could be signed into law as early as
February 1998. E.g., Timothy B. Hackman, Remarks at the Intellectual Property Owners An-
nual Meeting (Sep. 9, 1997).
86. -.R 400 is significantly narrower than S. 2272, which would have extended a prior
user defense to "good faith purchasers" who buy products that are subject to the prior user
defense and then resell them. Cf S. REp. No. 103-405, at 6 (1994). Moreover, S. 2272 did not
include H.R. 400's section 273(C)(7)'s one-year limitation. Cf S. 2272, 103d Cong. (1994).
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infringe the subsequent patent);87 (2) requires persons claiming prior
user rights to prove commercial use or reduction to practice of the
technology in the United States more than one year before the effec-
tive filing date of the patent; 8 and (3) provides that an infringer who
alleges the defense without reasonable basis would be liable for the
patentee's attorneys' fees under § 285.89 This article takes the fol-
lowing position with respect to H.R. 400: (1) It represents a healthy
balancing of interests, (2) it would level the playing field for U.S.
trade secret holders, and (3) it resolves a situation which requires a
statutory solution, even if that situation arises infrequently.
A. HR. 400 Effectively Balances Competing Interests
Overall, H.R. 400 represents a healthy balancing of competing
interests. H.R. 400 serves (1) the prior user's interests, by allowing
continued use and by bringing certainty to the area of law covered
by § 102(g); (2) the patentee's interests, by providing a limited right
to exclude, ensuring the prior user competes at a disadvantage (thus
preserving the patentee's market), and eliminating § 102(g) secret
prior art; and (3) the public interest, by bringing about dissemination
at a low cost (as the prior user and the subsequent patentee enter into
limited competition) and encouraging innovation.
1. H.R. 400 Serves the Prior User's Interests
By definition, H.R. 400 serves the prior user's interest in con-
tinued use. Associated with this interest in continued use is an inter-
est in certainty. H.R. 400 serves the prior user by bringing certainty
to the area of law currently covered by § 102(g). Although the cur-
rent regime most closely resembles the Invalidation Rule, there re-
mains some uncertainty. As one American inventor who testified be-
fore the House in favor of the prior user right notes:
In the case of non public use .... the law is silent. The validity of
the patent and the right to continue the use are both uncertain.
That uncertainty may generate some large legal fees, [and] it is a
killer for business - especially small business. Small businesses
87. H.RL 400, 105th Cong. §§ 273(B), 273(C)(2) (1997).
88. H.R. 400 § 273(C)(7).
89. H.R. 400 § 273(D).
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cannot afford the huge costs of resolving an issue in equity. Am-
biguity in the law hands the advantage to the deepest pocket.90
Because of the ambiguity in the law, a patentee may decide to
sue a prior user. Whether the trade secret holder wins or loses the
lawsuit, the disclosure requirements of the patent law dictate that the
trade secret is lost to the public domain with the issuance of the pat-
ent. Given the choice between (1) losing a trade secret but enjoying a
limited duopoly (under the Prior User Right Rule) and (2) losing a
trade secret to the public domain (under the disclosure requirements
of the patent law), a trade secret holder presumably would prefer the
former.
2. H.R. 400 Serves the Patentee's Interests
In addition to serving the prior user's interests, H.R. 400 serves
the patentee's interests by (1) providing a limited right to exclude; (2)
ensuring the prior user competes at a disadvantage; and (3) eliminat-
ing the category of secret prior art9' existing under § 102(g).
H.R. 400 supports a limited right to exclude.92 The right to ex-
clude has its basis in the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Consti-
tution, which provides "The Congress shall have power... [t]o pro-
mote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries."' 9
Interestingly, perhaps the strongest argument against H.R. 400
from the patentee's standpoint is that it erodes an existing right to ex-
clude. Robert Rohrback, a strong opponent of the prior user right,
notes that Congress and the courts have regarded the patentee's right
to exclude as sacrosanct and have permitted the erosion of the right to
exclude "only upon a clear showing of public interest of the highest
order [and] not to protect a private, commercial investment. '94
Likewise, interest groups voice the opinion that the prior user right
deprives inventors of the "constitutional right to exclude." 95 Other
90. Hearings on H. 2235, supra note 10 (testimony of Bill Budinger), at 103-104.
91. See supra note 53.
92. See H.R. 400.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
94. Rohrback, supra note 58, 'at 7.
95. Intellectual Property Creators Website (visited March 7, 1997)<http://www.best.com
/-ipc/iss2235.htm>.
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inventors see the prior user right as tantamount to royalty-free com-
pulsory licensing. 96
These arguments are flawed. Section 102(g) may invalidate a
patent in light of a secret prior use. Under the current regime, the
choice is not between the Prior User Right Rule and the Infringement
Rule, but between the Prior User Right Rule and the Invalidation
Rule. Arguably, H.R. 400 serves the patentee's interest by altering
the current statutory framework, moving it away from the Invalida-
tion Rule. In effect, a prior user defense may create a right to ex-
clude (albeit a limited one-which excepts a prior user) where no right
would have existed before. Accordingly, H.R. 400 makes it clear that
"[a] patent shall not be deemed to be invalid under § 102 or § 103 of
this title solely because a defense is established under this section." 97
H.R. 400 is equipped with many safeguards that ensure the pat-
entee's market will remain largely intact. For example, the prior user
right is void in cases involving bad faith or derivation from the appli-
cant, and the party alleging the defense may be liable for attorneys'
fees. 98 A prior user cannot take advantage of the patentee's pre-filing
disclosures to create a right against the patent.99  In the spirit
of § 102(g), abandoned experiments cannot establish a prior user
right to resurrect the invention. 100 The prior user defense is personal
and transferable only upon the good faith sale or transfer of the entire
business unit which exploits the right; therefore the prior user is un-
able to erode the patentee's market through mere licensing. 101
Improvements to the prior use are allowed only to the extent
they do not infringe claims of the subsequent patent, whether or not
they are independently developed. However, in a provision that
surely would spawn litigation, the statute provides that a prior user is
able to expand quantity and volume of use to meet reasonable market
demands. 10 2 Unfortunately, predicting market demand but-for the
96. See Hearings on HR. 2235, supra note 10 (testimony of William Budinger, quoting
an article from Inventor's Digest) at 103-104.
97. H.R. 400, 105th Cong. § 273(E) (1997).
98. H.R. 400 §§ 273(B), 273(D).
99. H.R. 400 §§ 273(C)(1), 273(C)(7).
100. H.R. 400 § 273(C)(5).
101. H.R. 400 § 273(C)(6).
102. H.R. 400 § 273(C)(2). The Campbell Amendment (H.A. 28) to H.R. 400 would have
function to "limit the prior domestic user to the kind and volume of the prior use." See Tho-
mas: Legislative Information on the Internet: (visited June 14, 1997)
<http:llthomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/7?rlO5:Jtemp/-rlO5WsZH:e1060.> However, the
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patentee's subsequent disclosure involves a difficult but unavoidable
counterfactual inquiry.
By eliminating the category of secret prior art currently existing
under § 102(g), H.R. 400 serves the patentee's reliance interest.
Again, the subsequent patentee's patent would not be invalidated; it
would operate against the world, minus the trade secret user. In ad-
dition, H.R. 400 ensures that the scope of the prior user right would
be linked to the invention's degree of commercialization. A low de-
gree of commercialization, implying little or no notice to the pat-
entee,103 would correspond to a narrow prior user right. A narrow
prior user right would correspond to slight erosion of the patentee's
market. In turn, slight erosion would imply a strong likelihood that
the prior use would not have affected the patentee's decision to pur-
sue a patent in the first place. Thus by eliminating § 102(g) secret
prior art, the prior user right would serve the patentee's reliance in-
terest in searching the public domain.
Overall, in addition to serving the prior user's interest in contin-
ued use, H.R. 400 adequately serves the patentee's interests, by (1)
providing a limited right to exclude; (2) ensuring the prior user com-
petes at a disadvantage, thus preserving the patentee's market; and
(3) eliminating § 102(g) secret prior art, thereby providing certainty
as the patentee searches the public domain before sinking R&D costs
into the invention.
3. H.R. 400 Serves the Public Interest
H.R. 400 is not limited to serving only the interests of the prior
user and of the patentee. It also serves the public by providing access
to inventions at low cost, as the patentee and prior user enter into
limited competition, and by encouraging - or at least not discour-
aging - innovative activities.
Campbell Amendment failed. Thomas: Legislative Information on the Internet (visited June
14, 1997) <http://thomas.loc.goc/cgi-bin/bdquery/zdlOS:HR0040O:@@@,X>. Some oppo-
nents to the Campbell Amendment expressed the views that it would be "extremely prejudicial
to start-up firms and small businesses which are frequently acquired by larger firms" (Rep.
Coble) and that it would discourage the transfer of a line of business to another firm that might
be more efficient and competitive (Rep. Delahunt). Thomas: Legislative Information on the
Internet (visited June 14, 1997) <http:llthomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/7?r1O5:./temp/-rlO5WsZ
H:e6123:>.
103. Arguably, a large amount of commercialization of the products of an inventive proc-
ess will be accompanied with lower prices (economies of scale) and increased profits for a pat-
entee's competitor, alerting the potential patentee of the possible existence of a trade secret.
Thus notice to the patentee is related to degree of commercialization.
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The prior user right serves the public by providing access to in-
ventions. H.R. 400's commercialization requirement, like the non-
informing public use and Friction Division inquiries, serves the pub-
lic interest in dissemination of inventions.1°4 H.R. 400 requires either
actual use in commerce or, in cases where commercialization re-
quires a "significant investment of time, money, and effort," 105 sub-
stantial material preparation for commercial use.106
The standard for preparation for commercial use would likely
take into account such factors as (1) the costs incurred by the prior
user and the proportion of those costs to the total costs for full com-
mercialization; (2) the time invested in preparation and the propor-
tion of that time to the total time required for full commercialization;
(3) the complexity of preparation for practicing the claimed prior use;
and (4) the diligence of the prior user in making preparations.10 7
Consideration of factors such as these ensures that the public will
reap the benefits of the invention as soon as possible.
Not only would the public enjoy dissemination of the invention,
but it would enjoy dissemination at a low cost. Under a prior user
right regime, the patentee and prior user would enter into limited
competition, driving prices down for the public. At first glance,
competition between the patentee and the prior user would, unfortu-
nately, result in diminished profits for both the patentee and prior
user, perhaps deterring innovation. However, as discussed in previ-
ous sections of this article, the prior user right would bring certainty
to the law, and this certainty would result in a more efficient market.
Therefore, the limited competition and accompanying lower prices
associated with a prior user right would not necessarily deter innova-
tion.
A more real risk is that the prior user right would discourage in-
novation by exalting secrecy over disclosure to the point of discour-
104. In fact, at least one commentator proposes incorporation of the anomalous secret use
versus non-informing public use distinction into the prior user defense. See Brownlee, supra
note 11.
105. H.R. 400, 105th Cong. § 302(a) (1997).
106. However, note that just before the House passed H.R. 400, an amendment was added
classifying some research use as commercial use as that term is used in the legislation.
107. These and other factors should be considered in forming the standard for sufficient
preparation for commercial use. These factors were derived by the Advisory Commission of
the United States Secretary of Commerce, formed in 1990, which developed advisory positions
for patent reform for the United States, and recommended the adoption of a prior user right.
WEGNER, supra note 11 at 126-27 (1993).
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aging use of the patent system, and with that, early public disclosure
of inventions. 08 As one scholar points out:
One of the basic purposes of any patent system ... is to encourage
use of the system to provide a disclosure of technology for the
subsequent benefit of the public, as contrasted with encouraging
secret uses that (a) prevent dissemination of technological infor-
mation; (b) avoid the possibility of development of design-
aound... technology by others; and (c) eliminate competition for
an indeterminate period while the secret remains undiscovered,
thus depriving the public of the beneficial effects of competi-
tion. 09
However, a closer analysis suggests that a prior user defense
will not encourage inventors to protect their inventions through trade
secrecy to the detriment of the patent system and its principles of dis-
closure. Instead, that choice will be dictated by the characteristics,
effectiveness, and suitability of each form of protection vis-h-vis the
particular invention. 10 As indicated by the Supreme Court in Ke-
wanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. ":
Trade secret law and patent law have coexisted in this country for
over one hundred years. Each has its particular role to play, and
the operation of one does not take away from the need for the
other. Trade secret law encourages the development and exploita-
tion of those items of lesser or different invention than might be
accorded protection under the patent laws, but which items still
have an important part to play in the technological and scientific
advancement of the Nation."12
In many situations, intellectual property protection through the
patent system is the natural solution. After all, trade secret protection
has its drawbacks. Independent discovery of an invention destroys a
trade secret. Trade secrecy does not protect against reverse engi-
neering. Moreover, in some cases, trade secret protection may be
prohibitively expensive.
However, in other contexts, trade secrecy is the only feasible
form of intellectual property protection. For example, citing the ex-
ample of inventive processes, one practitioner notes:
108. Rohrback, supra note 58.
109. Id. at 10.
110. Hearings on H. 2235, supra note 10 (testimony of H. Dieter Hoinkes).
111. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
112. d at493.
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[S]ecret use of technology cannot be dismissed as necessarily less
beneficial to society than publicly disclosed use. Many important
technological achievements - notably processes - can be effec-
tively exploited only through secret use. Processes naturally are
practiced away from the public's view in most cases. Patents cov-
ering them consequently are very difficult to enforce, so process
patents often do not provide meaningful protection.113
As noted by the Kewanee Court, patent law and trade secret law
have coexisted peacefully for hundreds of years."14 A prior user right
would not encourage all inventors to resort to trade secrecy to the
detriment of the patent system and its policy of disclosure. The prior
user right merely makes the option of trade secret protection a more
viable alternative for those inventions that would be better protected
by trade secret law.
The prior user right would not discourage innovation, but it may
actually encourage innovation by mitigating the pressure that many
businesses face in deciding whether to obtain patent protection for
relatively minor inventions for purely defensive purposes."5 Most
countries now have a petty patent system or a prior user right to pro-
tect marginal inventions at affordable costs." 6 While the current U.S.
patent law regime allows defensive protection of an invention
through the Statutory Invention Registration ("S.I.R.") procedure," 7
filing under this program requires the same degree of disclosure by
the inventor as in a patent application. Therefore, the S.I.R. does not
serve the inventor seeking protection for a trade secret. H.R. 400
would help economize resources by extending protection to marginal
inventions as most other countries currently provide.
Thus, the prior user right of H.R. 400 would serve the public
interest, would provide access to inventions at low cost as the pat-
113. Hearings on H. 2235, supra note 10 (testimony of Gary L. Griswold).
114. See text accompanying note 112.
115. Hearings on HR. 2235, supra note 10 (testimony of H. Dieter Hoinkes and of Karl
Jorda).
116. Hearings on HR. 2235, supra note 10 (testimony of Karl Jorda).
117. See 35 U.S.C. § 157 (1994); See generally 1 CISUM, supra note 64, § 3.07[2], at 3-
124. Through the S.I.R. program, an inventor discloses his invention with the same level of
detail required to obtain a patent. The PTO will not examine the disclosure for utility, novelty,
nor nonobviousness; and the inventor does not enjoy the right to exclude. The PTO publishes
the S.I.R., and this publication ensures that competitors will not secure a patent for the same
disclosed invention. Thus, the S.I.R. is a purely defensive device.
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entee and prior user enter into limited competition, and would en-
courage - or at the very least, not discourage - innovation.
B. H.R 400 Levels the Playing Field
The inclusion of a prior user right in the U.S. patent law would
redress a current imbalance of rights between U.S. and foreign busi-
nesses. Most foreign countries provide for a prior user right in their
patent laws."18 U.S. businesses that hold patents in those countries
cannot enforce these patents against prior users. However, the con-
verse is not true. A .domestic prior user has no prior use defense
when accused of infiingement by a foreign company holding a U.S.
patent. Importantly, over 40% of all patents issued in the U.S. are
granted to foreign entities, and this number is increasing." 9 Moreo-
ver, as of 1996, foreign inventors can rely on earlier foreign activities
to counter U.S. invention date proofs. 20 Thus, the United States has
been granting a large number patents to foreigners, while enhancing
the enforceability of those patents against U.S. prior users. A do-
mestic prior user right is needed to level the playing field.
The absence of a prior user right in the United States patent law
gives manufacturers who rely on trade secrecy protection an incen-
tive to locate plants in other countries.' 2' To illustrate, the former
chief intellectual property counsel at a chemical manufacturing com-
pany, which once needed to select a country in which to build a plant
implementing important inventive processes, notes:
When I was managing that business, we selected where we would
locate plants. When we were looking at U.S. versus outside the
United States (O.U.S.), a factor to consider was indeed whether or
not there was a prior user right when we were using trade secret
processes .... [T]his is a real consideration that real people man-
aging businesses... take into account.'2
118. See, e.g., Brownlee, supra note 11 at 526.
119. Twenty-First Century Patent Coalition (visited September 7, 1997)
<http://ipo.org/prioruser-SENATE.htm>; Hearings on H.R. 2235, supra note 10 (testimony of
H. Dieter Hoinkes); Paul R. Morico, Are Prior User Rights Consistent with Federal Patent
Policy?: The U.S. Considers Legislation to Adopt Prior User Rights, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 572, 579 (1996).
120. 35 U.S.C.A. § 104 (West Supp. 1997).
121. Hearings on H.R. 2235, supra note 10 (testimony of Gary L. Griswold). Manufac-
turers who rely on trade secrecy protection have an incentive to locate plants in countries with
a prior user right, so that they may defend themselves against subsequent patentees.
122. FPLC Conference, supra note 10 (statement of Gary L. Griswold).
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Perhaps there is a correlation between reliance on trade secrecy
and international operations, and perhaps the existence of a prior user
right in other countries affects that correlation. A recent United
States International Trade Commission report'2 shows that a large
number of United States companies that operate internationally con-
sider the trade secret to be of great, or very great, importance for
nearly 70% of their sales, and of moderate importance to another
24% of such sales.124 This far surpassed the importance assigned to
other forms of intellectual property protection.' 5 However, a more
detailed study is needed in order to draw any definite conclusions.
In summary, a prior user right is needed to level the playing
field between U.S. and foreign inventors. In particular, it is needed
to protect domestic prior users from foreign patentees and to avoid
discouraging manufacturers who rely on trade secrecy protection
from locating plants in the United States.
C. H.R. 400 Represents a Needed Statutory Solution
As a final matter, some critics argue that situations calling for a
prior user right arise so infrequently that a statutory prior user right is
not needed. 126 A related argument is that the 'patent system already
supports a "de facto" prior user right outcome (i.e., each party has
strong incentives for allowing coexistence of the patent and the prior
use), so the creation of a statutory right is not necessary.
Indeed, the limited data available relating to operation of the
prior user right in foreign countries suggests the incidence of prior
user right problems which would arise in practice in the United States
would be very small.127 With the exception of the Philippines, every
foreign country in the world operates under a first-to-file priority
rule.128 One justification for the inclusion of the prior user right in
the patent laws of foreign countries is that it alleviates the equitable
shortcomings of strict determination of patent rights by filing date.
29
123. Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and the Effect on U.S. Industry and
Trade, USITC Pub. 2065, (Feb. 1988).
124. Id.
125. Except the trademark, if it is considered a form of intellectual property. See ROBERT
M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 58 (1990).
126. See, e.g., Brownlee, supra note 11.
127. See infra note 130.
128. See supra note 13.
129. E.g., Ubel, supra note 7, at 433-34.
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Nevertheless, existing data suggests the prior user right is not in-
voked with great frequency in foreign countries. 130
Professor Karl Jorda, who served as patent counsel at Ciba-
Geigy, reports that in a recent ten-year period at Ciba-Geigy, AG
Switzerland, there were only three instances where the issue of prior
user rights arose. 131 Jorda estimates Ciba-Geigy Switzerland, a large
transnational company, files close to 1,000 patent applications per
year. 32 These numbers suggest that (at least in Ciba-Geigy's indus-
try) the issue of prior user rights comes up approximately once per
3,300 patent applications.
In a study on the frequency with which the prior user right is as-
serted, the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent,
Copyright, and Competition Law, Munich, sent a questionnaire to
several German and Danish patent attorneys who, because of the
composition of their clientele, would have special knowledge of
prior-user-right practice. 33 The patent attorneys replied that on aver-
age, they were consulted less than ten times per year regarding a prior
user right, and half of the patent attorneys reported they were con-
sulted less than five times per year regarding a prior user right. 134
In addition to suggesting that the incidence of a prior user right
situation is too small to merit a statutory solution, critics of a statu-
tory prior user right argue that a de facto prior user right already ex-
ists; that is, in any prior user situation, each party has strong incen-
tives for reaching amicable settlement. 35  Indeed, subsequent
patentees may be hesitant to put their patents on the block against
130. There appears to be no detailed empirical study on the frequency with which the
prior user right arises in foreign countries. Several scholarly articles cite the study reported in
Lise Osterborg, Towards a Harmonized Prior User Right Within a Common Market Patent
System, 12 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 447 (1981), which suggests that even at-
torneys likely to have experience dealing with the prior user right report being consulted only
rarely on prior user right issues. See infra text accompanying note 133.
131. Hearings on H.R. 2235, supra note 10 (testimony of Karl Jorda). Jorda notes that the
incidence of prior user disputes under foreign patent law is much less than the incidence of
interference disputes in our patent system. To prevail in an interference, one must prove re-
duction to practice; whereas to prevail as a prior user, one must prove actual commercial use or
preparation for commercial use - a much higher standard than mere reduction to practice.
132. Id.
133. Lise Osterborg, Towards a Harmonized Prior User Right Within a Common Market
Patent System, 12 INT'LREv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 447,461 (1981).
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Hearings on HR. 2235, supra note 10 (testimony of Karl Jorda).
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prior users.136 Likewise, prior users may prefer paying a small fee for
a license, realizing that third parties will be shut out by the valid pat-
ent.137 It is not surprising that just as most of our interferences are
settled amicably, 38 so are most prior user disputes in other countries.
However, even if a prior user right issue arises infrequently and
a de facto prior user right may exist already, a statutory prior user is
needed. The law dealing with § 102(g) appears unsettled and is a
source of uncertainty for both the patentee and the trade secret
holder.139 This uncertainty favors the party with the most litigating
resources. A statutory prior user right would eliminate this uncer-
tainty and would redefine the bargaining position of the parties. In
addition, perhaps a statutory solution is preferable to allowing parties
with strong incentives to settle their own priority dispute. As seen in
the context of settlements of patent interference proceedings,' 40 the
patent law recognizes that a strong mutual desire to settle a priority
dispute may lead to anticompetitive collusion. 41 Finally, the infre-
quency with which prior user right issues arise and the possible exis-
tence of a de facto prior user are not convincing arguments for a
company whose future depends on protection of intellectual property
through trade secrecy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The time has come for the United States to reincorporate a prior
user right in its patent law. H.R. 400 represents a healthy balancing
of the interests of the prior user, the patentee, and the public. First, it
serves the prior user's interests, by allowing continued use of inven-
tions with a greater degree of certainty than that currently provided
by § 102(g) and case law. Second, it serves the patentee's interests,
by providing a limited right to exclude; by ensuring the prior user
competes at a disadvantage, thus preserving the patentee's market;
136. Hearings on HR. 2235, supra note 10 (testimony of Karl Jorda); Jorda, supra note 5,
at601.
137. Jorda, supra note 5, at 602.
138. Hearings on HR 2235, supra note 10 (testimony of Karl Jorda).
139. Hearings on H. 2235, supra note 10 (testimony of Karl Jorda) (noting that "dejure
we have a totally unsettled situation").
140. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1994).
141. E.g., ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 317 (1992) ("The patent
code recognizes that the settlement of an interference dispute presents an excellent opportunity
for two competitors to engage in anticompetitive behavior, e.g., market division, price fixing
or the like.").
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and by eliminating § 102(g) secret prior art. Third, it satisfies the
public interest in dissemination of inventions at a low cost, as the
prior user and the subsequent patentee enter into limited competition.
Finally, a prior user right is needed to level the playing field for U.S.
inventors. H.R. 400 represents a needed statutory solution; thus, its
proposed section 273 should be added to the U.S. patent code.
ThIE PRIOR USER RIGFT OF HR. 400
APPENDIX A
H.R. 400 was passed by the House (amended) on April 23, 1997
and was referred to the Senate Committee on Judiciary on April 24,
1997. Title III of H.R. 400 would provide for a prior user right. The
portion quoted below is from section 302 ("Defense to Patent In-
fringement Based on Prior Domestic Commercial or Research Use")
of Title I, which proposes adding section 273 to 35 United States
Code. The following represents the amended version of H.R. 400
which was passed by the House and referred to the Senate Committee
on Judiciary:
273. Prior domestic commercial or research use; Defense to in-
fringement
(a) Definitions. For purposes of this section-
(1) The terms "commercially used," "commercially
use," and "commercial use" mean the use in the United
States in commerce or the use in the design, testing, or
production in the United States of a product or service
which is used in commerce, whether or not the subject
matter at issue is accessible to or otherwise known to the
public;
(2) in the case of activities performed by a nonprofit re-
search laboratory, or nonprofit entity such as a univer-
sity, research center, or hospital, a use for which the
public is the intended beneficiary shall be considered to
be a use described in paragraph (1) if the use is limited
to activity that occurred within the laboratory or non-
profit entity or by persons in privity with that laboratory
or nonprofit entity before the effective filing date of the
application for patent at issue, except that the use-
(A) may be asserted as a defense under this section
only by the laboratory or nonprofit entity; and
(B) may not be asserted as a defense with respect to
any subsequent use by any entity other than such
laboratory, nonprofit entity, or persons in privity;
(3) the terms "used in commerce," and "use in com-
merce" mean that there has been an actual sale or other
commercial transfer of the subject matter at issue or that
there has been an actual sale or other commercial trans-
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fer of a product or service resulting from the use of the
subject matter at issue; and
(4) the "effective filing date" of a patent is the earlier
of the actual filing date of the application for the patent
or the filing date of any earlier United States, foreign, or
international application to which the subject matter at
issue is entitled under section 119, 120, or 365 of this ti-
tle.
(b) Defense to infringement.
(1) A person shall not be liable as an infringer under
section 271 of this title with respect to any subject matter
that would otherwise infringe one or more claims in the
patent being asserted against such person, if such person
had, acting in good faith, commercially used the subject
matter before the effective filing date of such patent.
(2) The sale or other disposition of the subject matter of
a patent by a person entitled to assert a defense under
this section with respect to that subject matter shall ex-
haust the patent owner's rights under the patent to the
extent such rights would have been exhausted had such
sale or other disposition been made by the patent owner.
(c) Limitations and qualifications of defense. The de-
fense to infringement under this section is subject to the
following:
(1) Derivation. A person may not assert the defense un-
der this section if the subject matter on which the de-
fense is based was derived from the patentee or persons
in privity with the patentee.
(2) Not a general license. The defense asserted by a per-
son under this section is not a general license under all
claims of the patent at issue, but extends only to the
subject matter claimed in the patent with respect to
which the person can assert a defense under this chapter,
except that the defense shall also extend to variations in
the quantity or volume of use of the claimed subject
matter, and to improvements in the claimed subject
matter that do not infringe additional specifically
claimed subject matter of the patent.
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(3) Effective and serious preparation. With respect to
subject matter that cannot be commercialized without a
significant investment of time, money, and effort, a per-
son shall be deemed to have commercially used the sub-
ject matter if -
(a) Before the effective filing date of the patent, the
person reduced the subject matter to practice in the
United States, completed a significant portion of the
total investment necessary to commercially use the
subject matter, and made a commercial transaction
in the United States in connection with the prepara-
tion to use the subject matter; and
(b) thereafter the person diligently completed the
remainder of the activities and investments neces-
sary to commercially use the subject matter, and
promptly began commercial use of the subject
matter, even if such activities were conducted after
the effective filing date of the patent.
(4) Burden of proof. A person asserting the defense un-
der this section shall have the burden of establishing the
defense.
(5) Abandonment of use. A person who has abandoned
commercial use of subject matter may not rely on activi-
ties performed before the date of such abandonment in
establishing a defense under subsection (B) with respect
to actions taken after the date of such abandonment.
(6) Personal defense. The defense under this section may
only be asserted by the person who performed the acts
necessary to establish the defense and, except for any
transfer to the patent owner, the right to assert the de-
fense shall not be licensed or assigned or transferred to
another person except in connection with the good faith
assignment or transfer of the entire enterprise or line of
business to which the defense relates.
(7) One-year limitation. A person may not assert a de-
fense under this section unless the subject matter on
which the defense is based had been commercially used
or reduced to practice more than one year prior to the ef-
fective filing date of the patent by the person asserting
the defense or someone in privity with that person.
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(d) Unsuccessful assertion of defense. If the defense under
this section is pleaded by a person who is found to infringe
the patent and who subsequently fails to demonstrate a rea-
sonable basis for asserting the defense, the court shall find the
case exceptional for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees
under section 285 of this title.
(e) Invalidity. A patent shall not be deemed to be invalid un-
der section 102 or 103 of this title solely because a defense is
established under this section.
